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Grammatic Action and the Art of Tautology 
Alice Rayner 
Whether or not Aristotle's definition of drama as the imitation of 
an action is sufficient or satisfactory, let me presume here that, at 
the least, action constitutes drama and that action is something that 
drama "does," not something it "has." Our habits of description and 
critical theory tend to look at action as an attribute of drama and 
therefore as a basis of aesthetic judgement. When we (or, more 
likely, our children) say of a play or a film, "too much talk, not 
enough action," we are presuming that drama is a kind of container 
for action that can be measured and quantified as well as qualified 
and interpreted. But action is problematic when we begin to think 
harder about it. What constitutes an action and how do we construct 
the meaning of an action? What is the relation of a thinking, speak-
ing subject to an act?1 And more specifically, what is the grammar 
by which we conceive of an action? 
In this paper I want to use drama to help display the problems 
of action and its phenomenology by focusing on how drama helps us 
find the questions pertaining to the problem of action. Such questions 
appear in highest relief where we find moments of arrested action: 
where the momentum of dramatic action does not seduce us into 
forgetfulness and we are reminded that action is not only difficult to 
define, it is difficult to "do." 
Such a moment occurs briefly and particularly in Beckett's 
Waiting for Godot. Pozzo has risen from his campstool to leave. He 
would like to sit down again, but "doesn't quite know how to go about 
it." He knows what to do and even has the desire to do it, but is 
unable to move from standing to sitting. This moment of arrested 
action reflects the larger action of the play in which the hesitations 
of thought, particularly by Vladimir, present the questions of why and 
how to go on waiting. In Pozzo's statement and his incapacity to 
move, it appears that something has intruded between desire and 
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physical motion, as the character implicitly poses the adverbial ques-
tion: how do I get from here to there? Pozzo is stuck. And rather 
than calling it an intrusion of some thing between thought and motion, 
we might say that for Pozzo at this moment a void gapes between 
himself and the campstool: a void opening out of thought because of 
thought. We cannot know the content of his thinking, but it is not 
the content that inhibits him; it is thinking itself with its inability to 
answer the question and its fundamental incompatibility with doing. 
The "how to" of an action can be answered as though it were a simple 
objective question. How do you do it? You "put one foot in front of 
the other;" or you "send certain neuro-muscular messages from your 
brain to your foot." But these responses reside in essentially technical 
description that may be accurate and, at some point, useful, but will 
leave us in despair of an answer. They will lead only to further 
questions that we cease asking only out of fatigue or compromise. 
The adverbial questions such as "how" and, worse, "why" have, of 
course, been discovered by children as torments to the adult who is 
carried along by the momentum of "adult" actions. But the questions 
persist and become "adult" questions to torment the innocence of even 
the faithful Didi and Gogo. 
The manner of the adverb that is crucial to action can be im-
itated ("Do it this way") but not "thought." Quite simply there is no 
fully satisfactory linguistic answer to the question, "how?" Pozzo's 
hesitation is without identifiable content and without language, so he 
is arguably not exactly thinking: but the intrusion itself is an ar-
rested action that suggests how fragile the connection and how enor-
mous the gap between desire, thought, and motion can be. 
Pozzo needs, he says, an invitation. In order to help, Estragon 
begs him to be seated. After the conventions of polite exchange and 
a second invitation ("take a seat I beseech you, you'll get pneumonia") 
Pozzo is enormously relieved. The invitation provides his cue, which 
as I discuss further on, is a "theatrical" term for saying it provides 
the impulse for his motion from standing to walking to the stool to 
sitting. Furthermore, the mutual acceptance of a fiction ("you'll get 
pneumonia") provides, we might suppose, a kind of "belief," if not 
faith, in the possibility of a reason for action that then allows Pozzo 
to move. The impulse and the fiction get Pozzo out of the stasis of 
thought and pave over the void. The cue for action provides the 
means of saying, "the time is now." It bridges the gap of thought by 
means of social convention and, moreover, affords relief from the 
effort of willful self-assertion. For one of the problems of action is 
not what to do, but when to do it. Deciding the moment for action 
requires an assertion not only of the mind or the motive but of the 
body. As I will discuss later, this problem is not simply 
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"psychological" but a problem of being in time. The question of how 
one joins consciousness to one's action is also a question of when 
consciousness is present in the act. In Beckett, the problem can be 
defined as one of inertia: bodies at rest tend to stay at rest. In this 
Pozzo-scene, the impulse energy of the invitation is all that he needs 
to allow "thought" and the hesitations of thought, to disappear in 
deed. The cue, that is, throws Pozzo back into the flow of time, and 
motion is possible. 
We perceive the problem of action when we become aware of the 
gaps between desire, thought, physical motion, and time. Athletes 
recognize the problem acutely. For the athlete, too much conscious-
ness can ruin performance. As San Francisco Giant Joel Youngblood 
put it: "The worst thing you can do when you're hitting the ball 
really well is to talk about what you're doing . . . because the next 
thing that happens is, you start thinking about what you're doing 
instead of just doing it. Then you don't do it any more." This is not 
wholly an anti-thought posture. Teammate Mike Aldrete says it this 
way: "I like to think I'm not unconscious up there, but . . . I'm not 
getting all caught up in what I'm doing and I'm not trying to do 
anything I can't do. What these athletes are describing, I think, is 
what I call the tautology of action and the perfect conformity of 
mind, body and time. 
Most dramas eliminate gaps between desire, motion and time by 
presuming a coherence of these elements contained in the agency of a 
character. Action can be taken for granted as characters combat the 
obstacles of external forces. Pozzo gives us a small clue that not all 
such obstacles can be identified externally. The mystery of the phe-
nomenon of action, however, appears on a larger scale, as we might 
expect, in Hamlet. It is a play constituted by hesitation, delay, ar-
rested action: an enlargement and elaboration of the problem, "I'd 
like very much to (sit down or hit a home run or kill the king) but I 
don't quite know how to go about it." 
Let me suppose first that our own grammar supplies clues to the 
difficulties. The chasm between mind and motion, thought and action, 
finds an analogue in the difference in function between nouns and 
verbs. In the nominative form, the notion of an "act" is possible only 
from a conceptual vantage point outside "acting." To conceive of an 
act and to name it is to project a completion. We can make such a 
projection or objectification either before or after the doing. But to 
"nominate" an act is to create a fiction by extricating an object from 
the mode of verbs. It is the verbal, active mode that takes time into 
account. 
We name something "revenge," for example, by postulating the 
completion of a deed that corresponds to the unity of motive and 
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doing. Revenge constitutes a "thing" in which a deed of killing 
reciprocates a desire for the symmetry of justice. But the thingness 
of the act is an illusion of grammar that enables thought to stop the 
flow of on-going events in the momentary stillness of the noun. We 
sense that Hamlet delays because we imagine with him, an idea of the 
completed act. Hamlet's problem, in grammatical terms, is how to 
make the leap between the nominative projection of the act into the 
verbal "presencing" or doing of the act. Like Pozzo, he needs some-
thing that will throw him into the present tense of motion. 
Part of Hamlet's difficulty, of course, is that his mind and reason 
are antithetical to deed. I do not mean just Hamlet the character 
seems to have an aversion to the act of revenge or that he cannot 
seem to find the means or the time to join the conception of the act 
(Revenge) to its verb (revenge). Reason is an obstacle to action, but 
not because revenge is unreasonable. Reason, like the noun, is con-
stitutionally a separate mode for functioning in the world. It sepa-
rates, as Hamlet suggests, humans from beasts and is as much an 
integral part of human nature as nouns are to grammatic nature. But 
there is no obvious site at which the mental act-which is capable of 
conceiving the completed act-transforms into the doing in the con-
creteness of time and space. The habits of the mind to name and to 
conceive an act as a thing do not immediately conform to the 
capacities of the body to do. A simpler way of putting this might be 
simply to pose an old question: how does thought become action? 
What relationship does the mental act have to the physical and what 
do either have to do with signification or definition of an "act?" 
Character, especially as it implies embodiment, is our most con-
venient means of giving a site for action because character is the site 
for both reason (thought) and doing. I mean to suggest a definition 
of character that is anti-mimetic: character is not that which imitates 
a real or imaginarily real person with a definable collection of traits 
but that which locates specific qualities at a junction of act (as idea) 
and acting. In discussing what appears to be Hamlet's difficulty, I 
assign the problem of action to the agency of the character but that 
is largely because character is such a convenient metaphor. It also 
happens, however, that the problem of Hamlet (if he were a "real" 
character) and the problem of Hamlet are virtually identical. 
Pretending that Hamlet represents a "real" character, we might 
say that he lives-acutely and painfully aware-in the gap between 
thinking and doing. His first articulated desire ("O that this too too 
sullied flesh would melt,/Thaw and resolve itself into a dew") is to be 
relieved of the burden and pollution (solid or sullied) of materiality 
that is the necessary physical agency for action. Hamlet bears the 
burden of materiality, but it is that very "matter" that the ghost 
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requires for revenge; spirit alone is incapable of concrete action. 
Hamlet is further aware that the motive and cue for action are some-
how insufficient to create an act. As long as one can isolate the 
motive and the cue from the deed, as long as they are visible as 
separate entities, the action cannot be fully constituted. Hamlet has 
plenty of models to imitate, if imitation were all that were required 
for action. Fortinbras and Laertes demonstrate what to do and even 
how to do it. But to ask Hamlet to imitate them is equivalent to 
asking Pozzo to put one foot in front of another to get back to his 
campstool or to showing Hamlet a revenge manual. It is not the 
physical act or the observable deed or even the convention that 
comprises action. Any action from Hamlet requires the full conformity 
of mind and doing. But that conformity is not simply a matter of 
setting one's mind to the task, as though will or judgment or decision 
were simple predicates to doing. 
A specific speech in the play helps to anatomize the problem of 
action as we see it in Hamlet and also offers a strategy for under-
standing its phenomenology. As we might expect, the speech comes 
from the Gravedigger. 
If I drown myself wittingly, it argues an act, and an act 
hath three branches—it is to act, to do, and to perform. 
(5.1.9-11) 
We rarely pause over this speech. It is yet another echo of the 
"problem of action" that dominates the play and gives us a new dimen-
sion, if not relief, in a comic moment. Using the formalities of 
logical proof, the character of the Clown proves by tautological defi-
nition that an act is an act is an act, and at the same time proves 
himself a rustic who does not know how to make a logical form "get 
somewhere." Humor rises in the disparity between the presumable 
conviction of the clown that he is actually proving a point, and the 
nonsense that there is substance in his proof. If we were concerned 
that all the spoofing of academic pretentiousness had been murdered 
with Polonius, the clown brings back the verbal ghost of the old 
counsellor, reminding us of an emptiness and impotence in logical 
forms. 
However, if Polonius had too many distinctions for the repre-
sentation of an act, the clown has none: "to do, to act, and to 
perform" competes with "tragedy, comedy, history, pastoral, pastoral-
comical, historical-pastoral, tragical-historical, tragical-comical-histori-
cal-pastoral" to win the nonsense prize. Yet more than one critic has 
noticed the potential for making distinctions between the self-defining 
terms of the clown. This speech, Harry Levin points out, "rings the 
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changes on a momentous word."4 The lines become the cryptic diag-
nosis of Hamlet's conundrum. Joan Hartwig suggests that the grave-
digger's speech "helps us to understand the befuddling distinctions that 
each term insists be made between them." 
'Acting' with its punning significance of the theatrical 
putting on of a role other than what the person is; 'doing' 
with its ambivalent sexual and direct physical action implied; 
and 'performing' with its adjustments according to the 
performer's sense of how the audience perceives him are 
distinct values of the 'act.'5 
Rather than looking at the thematic significance of the speech, 
however, let me look first at a feature of the clown's grammar. He 
puts the three branches of an act in the infinitive. The infinitive is 
the form of a verb as it becomes a noun in the syntax of a sentence. 
The infinitive is our grammatical means of resolving the differences 
between nouns and verbs, but as such is the most meditative and 
abstract and the least bound to the concreteness of subjectivity, time 
or objects. The infinitive form thus exposes its own kind of void in 
language: it is empty ("not limited," according to Webster's New 
World Dictionary) of person, number, or tense. We know, thanks to 
Maynard Mack, that the interrogative mood dominates the play. But 
Hamlet poses many of his interrogatives-especially in his meditation 
on action and death—in the infinitive forms of the verb. (To be/not 
to be; to suffer; to take arms; to die, to sleep; to grunt and sweat). 
Hamlet's problem, and the problem of the dramatic action in general, 
is how to move from the abstraction of the infinitive into the active, 
from the nominative to the verbal. The course of the plot carries us 
through the verbal back to the nominative, from playing to the play, 
acting to the act just as the temporal unfolding of action in time may 
lead us to a name for the act but that name costs us the presence of 
action that is forever receding or proceeding in time. Hamlet keeps 
hold of his action rhetorically by naming the possibilities in the 
infinitive: but it is clearly a means of keeping consciousness aloof 
and uncommitted and a way of stopping time at least in thought. The 
infinitive is an attempt to speak with both dimensions of noun and 
verb but the compromised result is an atemporal conception that 
withholds from both body and consciousness their participation and 
presence in time. 
The clown, then, is a philosopher, using his infinitives as ab-
stract conceptions that in some sense are empty grammatical 
constructions. We can quite rightly interpret distinctions as Hartwig 
has done. But I want to look instead at the relation of the clown's 
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tautology to one of Heidegger's who, in "The Origin of the Work of 
Art," makes a characteristically enigmatic statement: "The world 
worlds!' I am not concerned here with the specifics of the philo-
sophical context and meaning of such a statement but with my sense 
that what makes such statements difficult is that Heidegger is forced 
to use grammar to invoke our understanding for a "pre-grammatic" 
condition, even though understanding is conditioned by grammar. It is 
impossible to think about being and time without the analytic tools of 
grammar, but such analysis leads us away from understanding insofar 
as it falsifies the totality or unity of time, space and consciousness. 
Consciousness formed by grammar separates itself from the concretes 
of time and space then tries to overcome its emptiness and reunite 
with being and "speak" the concreteness of being. The old question of 
language and knowledge asks, always, the degree to which a concept 
can be, if ever, identical to that which it conceives. The difficulty 
arises because the most accurate grammatical representation of the 
unity of being is an almost unintelligible tautology, such as "the world 
worlds" or "appropriation appropriates." Such phrases are attempts to 
recognize time, characterized by the verb, as an essential element, an 
inseparable feature, of things. Our grammar conceals the fact that we 
are capable of naming a thing (whether that thing is an object or an 
act) only by excising it from the reality of time. 
The noun allows us to function conceptually. It holds time in 
abeyance, taking the temporal dimension out of our consideration of 
things. The verb allows that objects are predicated in time and 
throws the object into time in the sentence. But a person or an 
object "has" its being insofar as it is identical to itself and is iden-
tical to itself when it is apart from my grammar that conceives it. 
Even to say "this is a table" divides the "being" of the table at the 
same time that the grammar creates a table in ways that the mind can 
understand. The closest grammar can get to being is the tautology 
but the tautology subverts analysis. Language carries within itself a 
nostalgia for self-identify and a desire to recreate the self-identical 
nature of being and at the same time resists self-defining forms. 
The problem becomes more acute when we attempt to understand 
an act. The word itself suggests the paradox insofar as it is a noun 
that circumscribes a process as well as a verb that includes an object. 
It is a word that wears both temporal and conceptual disguises. 
Saying the word "act" we identify the "thingly" aspect of time. We 
identify a temporal collocation of motion, desire and place, as a means 
of conceiving change as it filters through a human agency. Our 
language, nonetheless, consistently points out the conceptual paradox 
in the number of words that can function as nouns and verbs. Unlike 
Heidegger, we may rarely use the same word in both functions to 
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create a sentence, but such formulations as "the actor acts" or "the 
revenger revenges" begin to take us into the tautological territory of 
action. 
James Calderwood can help me join this abstract discussion to 
Hamlet by pointing out the nature of the proper noun and its relation 
to Hamlet's difficulties. The proper noun is a version of the gram-
matical tautology I have been describing. 
As a class, proper names are the linguistic ultimates-the 
verbal quarks and neutrinos~of particularizing, the point at 
which an existentialist reduction would have to stop, since 
it is at that point that meaning is stripped from words and 
we are left to confront sheer being. Thus Wittgenstein 
observed that "a name cannot be dissected any further by 
means of definition: it is a primitive sign;" and Gilbert 
Ryle adds that "dictionaries do not tell us what proper 
names mean—for the simple reason that they do not mean 
anything."" 
The proper name of the play, shortened by convention, is Hamlet, 
corresponding to the featured character, Hamlet, and this unity sug-
gests one kind of tautology between play, process and character. But 
given the earlier discussion, the aspect of proper name might also be a 
basis for suggesting that in some sense the play projects no signif-
icance insofar as it is a self-identical thing, an act that acts the 
problem of the actant. This further allows us to say that any play 
can be understood as an occasion for meaning. The drama is a 
temporal process when meaning occurs, but its tautological nature 
prevents us from speaking the "truth" of its meaning. 
Let me return now to the ways in which the clown's speech 
suggests an analytic of action in spite of its tautological formulation. 
Michael Goldman has explored the problem in Acting and Action in 
Shakespearean Tragedy. He identifies the questions: "how does action 
begin, where does it end, and how do we identify its course."' These 
questions, of course, are the very materials of dramatic action and 
every drama in some degree is a strategy for answering them. 
Goldman cites Austin's tri-partite distinctions of action: the stages 
(mental preparation), the phases (discreet physical doings) and 
stretches (the effects or results). These distinctions clearly recall 
Austin's speech-act theory of the locutionary, illocutionary and per-
locutionary elements of speech: the statement, the intention and the 
result. Both Goldman's formulation of the questions and Austin's 
speech-act model imply a dramatistic model: that is, both rest upon 
the form of a "beginning, middle and end" as the shape of an action. 
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But action as that which unfolds in time, as something that "has" a 
beginning, middle and end, is only a partial conception. 
Suppose that the gravedigger anticipated both Austin and 
Goldman and that he makes similar distinctions so that an interpreta-
tion of his terms yields us the behavioral, the motivational and the 
performative aspects of an act. 
"To do" might then distinguish itself as the behavioral or observ-
able aspect of an act. It is the most concrete element and is most 
easily removed from intentions or consequences. In this sense, "doing" 
is most available to description and hence, to science, like the locu-
tionary aspect of the speech act. Out of behavior, the observer might 
perceive characteristic patterns or habits that create a form. That 
form, in turn, would be susceptible to analytic as well as descriptive 
analysis. 
When we look at Hamlet's behavior through the course of the 
play we see more variation than pattern. Hamlet's pattern of behavior 
resists classification. As Bert States has said, Shakespeare found "a 
blend of what might normally be considered incompatible forms of 
behavior that not only co-exist in one temperament but in their 
restless commotion create the impression of a mystery that can be 
only partially explained through the text."^ We may be as uncertain 
as Claudius or as mistaken as Polonius in trying to account for the 
cause of Hamlet's many behaviors. The variations in his behavior lead 
us to speaking of Hamlet as the consummate actor or "behaviorist" 
who can function in every new situation in a new way: one who has 
no core of consistency. Consistency is more of a problem for the 
observer than for the doer inasmuch as the observer seeks pattern in 
behaviors. As scientific observers we might say that Hamlet con-
sistently thinks, talks or delays, but the dramatic character, Hamlet, 
never asks himself for the "through line" of his behavior; he asks how 
he can do what he wants to do, and when he can (or must) do it. 
The clown appears to know that a crucial concern is not be-
havior alone but intent as well. "If a man go to this water and drown 
himself, it is, will he nill he, he goes, mark you that. But if the 
water come to him and drown him, he drowns not himself." (5.1.14-16) 
As the proverb goes, in terms of the event, whether the pot hits the 
pitcher or the pitcher hits the pot, it's going to be bad for the 
pitcher. In terms of human action, however, the problem of motive or 
intention intrudes upon the definition of the act. In any conventional 
sense, Hamlet "has" sufficient motive to act. Regardless of whether 
the ghost is a self-projection or a reality, a "spirit of health or goblin 
damned," it constitutes a call to action. The ghost is the invitation 
and the cue for revenge. One of the play's mysteries is that it offers 
no demonstrable correlation between Hamlet's behavior and that 
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motive. He is "motivated" to take revenge on Claudius, not to put on 
an antic disposition, to torment Ophelia or to tease Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern. By the very disjunction between motive and behavior, 
however, the play allows us to distinguish two discreet elements of 
action. The play dislocates motive and behavior and shows them as 
separate entities. This is very different from suggesting that Hamlet 
has secret motives for his behavior or that his motive cannot over-
come his inertia or his scruples. 
The third part of the clown's tautology is "to perform." I would 
look at the element of "performance" not simply as analogous to the 
"stretches" or consequences in Austin's trinity, although Hamlet is 
certainly concerned with consequences. He is fully aware in "to be or 
not to be" that clear intentions do not necessarily lead to known 
consequences. And he is clearly concerned with futurity and the 
unknowns of the undiscovered country. Performance, rather, asks us 
to look at the context in which action occurs. In the most specific 
way, performance implies the need for an audience or observer to the 
action. But this does not mean that performance is simply the culmi-
nation or consequence of some previous process or exercises in motive 
gathering. Performance is not a result or a goal but rather the 
occasion of the action where an audience (or consciousness) 
participates. 
The issues of performance in Hamlet are more clearly related to 
theatricality than with consequence. We can presume Hamlet's skill as 
an actor and a playwright. If he feigns madness, he is certainly 
convincing enough to Polonais and Ophelia and the court. His advice 
to the Players is sound; his additions to their play, effective. But as 
an analytic of action, "to perform," concerns more than the character's 
theatrical skills. 
Certainly by the time Hamlet actually stabs and poisons Claudius 
in his double-dose of revenge, he has the full court for his audience. 
We might enlarge the sphere of performance, however, to include not 
simply witnesses to the act but to indicate the requirement of the 
appropriate context for the act. And context, in the theatrical im-
plications of "performance" includes the concreteness of time and 
place. Hamlet cannot perform his act until he finds himself in the 
right "theatre" which is to say, in part, in the right place at the right 
time. Regardless of behavior or motive, the act is not complete until 
it is put into the theatre. And this is not simply a matter of having 
witnesses to the act or insisting that the play does not exist until it 
is actually performed. I mean rather, that part of the completion of 
an action is in finding "form" in the concreteness of time and space. 
Form, however, does not follow the action. Form occurs simul-
taneously, at least in drama, by means of the consciousness that 
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forms. It is a matter of having a consciousness present; a conscious-
ness, moreover, that not only participates but can tell of it: can in 
fact create the story or the fiction that says, something was done. 
The playwright has the advantage of distance from a fictional action; 
he has only to conceive. The actor has the advantage of working 
within a preconceived pattern of actions; he has only to do. Hamlet's 
paradigmatic problem is that he is both actor and author, working 
under the imperatives of doing, conceiving and performing, of con-
forming thought, motive and deed. And this is where Horatio comes 
in. Horatio needs neither to conceive action nor to act nor does he 
have any particular motive. But as friend and confidant he will bring 
the infinitive forms of Hamlet's verbs to the indicative mood, albeit 
past tense, and tell the "occurents, more and less" as well as the 
motives "which have solicited." Futurity is implicit in Horatio's capac-
ity to tell the plot of the motive and deeds. 
Horatio is obviously Hamlet's perfect audience who will make 
known what has happened. In his plea to Horatio, Hamlet says, "what 
a wounded name, Things standing thus unknown, shall live behind me!" 
(5.2.33-34) Horatio is there to redeem Hamlet's name by telling his 
story. So with the recognition of the need for audience and story-
teller, Hamlet returns us to the idea of behavior as the "observable" 
element of action. Behavior is "unknown" without the observer who 
perceives and creates pattern out of inchoate gestures or deeds. To 
make behavior known is to bring it into the sphere of the intelligible; 
but such intelligibility is at the cost of "being" and is necessarily a 
fiction that severs the irretrievable moment of an action in time from 
the flow of time, yet redeems it by making it repeatable. 
To perform, then, is more than a further definition of "do" and 
"act." How Hamlet came to be able to conform motive and action 
remains a "mystery" that needs further exploration. We know, approx-
imately, when it happened, but cannot know quite how. We do wit-
ness, however, that his act finds completion in a performance that 
includes not simply the killing of the king but the production of the 
play, Hamlet. It is not just that Hamlet self-references Hamlet, but 
that the dramatic action performs for us the three branches of the 
problem of action as well as its tautological nature. 
Aristotle gives a clue to the dramatic tautology in the Poetics 
when he says on the one hand that plot is the "heart and soul" of 
tragedy and then, further, that plot is the goal or telos of tragedy. 
Aristotle's own circularity, as Reuben Brower has pointed out, suggests 
that plot is both the animating principle that structures events as well 
as the destination. The process of selection that presumes a pattern 
of action is also the process that creates the pattern. Plot as "soul" 
or animating principle is the manifestation of a desire for coherence 
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in the on-goingness of incoherent change. Time and change are the 
materials of plot in the sense that plot makes an "object" out of past, 
present and future. To that extent, it falsifies time and change-the 
mode of verbs-even as it makes them perceptible. Plot thus presumes 
an event even as it creates that event. And plot names an event by 
imagining coherence. The very act of finding pattern brings pattern 
into being and hence is the destination, result or goal of plot making. 
Peter Brooks says it this way: 
Plot as a logic of narrative would hence seem to be 
analogous to the syntax of meanings that are temporarily 
unfolded and recovered, meanings that cannot otherwise be 
created or understood. . . . It is my simple conviction, 
then, that narrative has something to do with time-bounded-
ness, and the plot is the internal logic of the discourse of 
mortality. 
Walter Benjamin has made this point in the simplest 
and most extreme way, in claiming that what we seek in 
narrative fictions is that knowledge of death which is 
denied to us in our own lives: the death that writes finis 
to the life and therefore confers on it its meaning. 'Death,' 
says Benjamin, 'is the sanction of everything that the 
storyteller can tell.'. . . . Only the end can finally deter-
mine meaning, close the sentence as a signifying totality. ^ 
To perform is to display the act to view; taking the corpse of the act 
"like a soldier to the stage." In this sense, it is not Hamlet who 
finally performs. By the time he kills Claudius, revenge is virtually 
irrelevant. The plot, however, completes the act, puts the act on 
stage and brings action into being. The plot itself is a self-identical 
tautology that does, acts and performs. 
But what, then, of the human agency? In what sense can con-
sciousness participate in action? "If I drown myself wittingly, it 
argues an act." This is the predication of the clown's proof. "Wit-
tingly," in other words, qualifies the nature of the verb and identifies 
the manner or what we might call the style of the drowning. Wit, 
then, is not a thing that acts, it is something that enters action. 
Style, which is the "manner of the adverb," cannot be prior to the 
verb and does not function outside the activity of the verb. Style is 
the "je ne sais quoi" in drama as well as fashion because it is nothing 
that can exist on its own; it fully depends upon action for its 
presence. 
Now Hamlet clearly functions for most of the play with a witty 
style: it is thus a style of the mind that attaches itself primarily to 
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the action of speaking and thinking not to the action of killing. 
Hamlet introduces himself to us wittily, opening his character with a 
joke ("A little more than kin and less that kind"). And Hamlet acts 
wittily through four acts of the play, producing a character that is 
almost purely playful because it is not engaged in the brute physicality 
of corporeal action. Wit is the style of the mind of Hamlet that 
disengages him and allows him the free play of the mind through an 
enormous range of rhetorical digressions and elaboration. The plot of 
the play follows this technique of digression in an almost endless 
series of deferrals and indirections that continually resist forward 
action. The plot is as witty as Hamlet because its structure follows 
the forms of rhetorical argument rather than dramatic action, as 
Calderwood has illustrated: 
In retrospect we can see that the form of the play, so 
stressed by Shakespeare, can be likened to several rhetorical 
constructions—what Puttenham calls 'tmesis,' 'parenthesis,' 
and 'parabasis. * 
The free play of the structure is thus kin to the mind-which is 
to say, rhetoric~of Hamlet. Such kinship gives the play itself a form 
of subjectivity that appears to be self-creating. The play, in this 
sense, is a subject, not an object. Tautologically speaking, the play is 
a subject in play, not an object that is played. Character, further-
more, is a means of locating the subjectivity that is in play through 
the course of action. This is just to say, as Marion Trousdale has 
suggested, that character is a rhetorical place rather than the simple 
representation of a person. But more than that, the character 
Hamlet locates consciousness in the action, and the troubles that 
Hamlet has in acting highlight the troubles that consciousness has in 
the material dimension of action. 
Play and play consciousness, following Hans-Georg Gadamer's lead 
in Truth and Method, is a mode of being and a mode of action into 
which a player throws himself. In these terms, Hamlet is the subjec-
tivity that plays Hamlet and who is "taken" by the nature of the play 
itself. 
. . . the primacy of play over consciousness of the player is 
fundamentally acknowledged. . . . Play obviously represents 
an order in which the to-and-fro motion of play follows of 
itself. It is part of play that the movement is not only 
without goal or purpose but also without effort. It happens, 
as it were, by itself. The ease of play, which naturally 
does not mean that there is any real absence of effort, but 
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phenomenologically refers only to the absence of strain, is 
experienced subjectively as relaxation. 3 
In the course of Hamlet we witness Hamlet's playfulness. But 
this playfulness is not identical to play for it is a mode of his mind 
rather than "action." Hamlet's playfulness lacks the corporeality of 
actual play. He is not, so to speak "in the game," and we constantly 
see the strain of his efforts. A crucial change occurs when he hears 
of the exploits of Fortinbras and Poland, where Fortinbras is going to 
risk thousands of lives for a worthless plot of land. "Exposing what 
is mortal and unsure To all that fortune, death and danger dare, Even 
for an eggshell." (4.4.51-53) Fortinbras provides a model not just as 
a man of action but as one who will risk all for nothing, who is thus 
a genuine player in a game that signifies nothing. Fortinbras, we 
hear, is risking all for nothing, and what is that if not play? After 
this, Hamlet resolves, "O, from this time forth, My thoughts be bloody, 
or be nothing worth!" (4.4.65-66) This is a resolve to make thought 
corporeal but it is also a resolve to throw himself into play. And 
here Hamlet leaves the scene for the rest of the act. It is a period 
for the actor and character to relax, and when Hamlet returns to the 
scene, we see him at ease. The strain of his mind against action 
relaxes and he is fully in play, and (we imagine) more fully himself. 
The witty Hamlet disappears and the witting Hamlet returns. We 
may say that the witty style that has kept Hamlet from engagement in 
action, that has kept him self-involved, becomes a style of "under-
standing." His language changes style. He reports to Horatio how it 
happened that he found the letters ordering his own death. The 
discovery of those letters is something that happened to Hamlet 
through no will of his own: the discovery required no self-assertion. 
Rashly, 
And praised be rashness for it-let us know, 
Our indiscretion sometime serves us well 
When our deep plots do pall, and that should learn us 
There's a divinity that shapes our ends, 
Rough-hew them how we will— 
(5.2.6-11) 
Hamlet puts his happy accident in providential terms. Even in hap-
pening to have his father's signet ring to seal the warrant "was 
heaven ordinant." But this notion of Providence could also be describ-
ed by Gadamer's notion of play: Hamlet has finally submitted to the 
sphere of play and a game whose rules do indeed shape the ends of 
the play. 
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Such submission of the will to play is an act which itself gener-
ates understanding. By his "rash" action, Hamlet loses the kind of 
consciousness or will that is prior to an action. Hamlet and most of 
his critics rely on a conceptual model of action that presumes con-
sciousness is prior to action or that it is a preparatory phase that is 
organized before action occurs physically. Such a model, as I sug-
gested above, is behind Austin's speech act theory that Goldman takes 
up in his question of action. It is composed of a trinity that struc-
turally corresponds to the Aristotelian form of beginning, middle, end; 
to the mechanistic form of cause, action, effect; to the Freudian form 
of id, ego, super-ego; to the Stanislavski model of acting formed on 
the idea of motive, behavior and effect; and, of course, to the tem-
poral model of past, present and future as well as the spatial model of 
inside, outside and context. The conceptual model organizes event and 
action diachronically. It presumes that the assertion of will, like the 
assertion of a sentence, unfolds in sequence. Such a form of unfold-
ing does not wholly account for the tautology of self-identity that 
includes self-understanding. Gadamer suggests that understanding 
"cannot be grasped as a simple activity of the consciousness that 
understands," nor is it "self-evident certainty" or something that 
"happens to the self, something through which it becomes an authentic 
self." Instead, says Gadamer, "understanding involves a moment of 
loss of self that is relevant to theological hermeneutics and should 
be investigated in terms of the structure of the game."14 
Hamlet's absence from the stage is the structural equivalent to 
such a "loss of self." Even in the contemplation of death at the 
graveside, there is in Hamlet a kind of "buoyancy" that Gadamer 
describes as a feature of one who is possessed by the game, because 
buoyancy is a feature of the game itself. Hamlet has relinquished the 
wit and autonomy of the earlier scenes and appears, in his absence, to 
have submitted to the action of the game. He is carried, as it were, 
by the flow of time but is carried in the mode of understanding. But 
he further represents the consciousness within the action who wins 
understanding. "Whoever 'tries,'" says Gadamer, "is in fact the one 
who is tried. The real subject of the game . . . is not the player, but 
instead the game itself. The game is what holds the player in its 
spell, draws him into play, and keeps him there."15 The plot itself is 
thus what animates Hamlet and "shapes his ends:" the psyche and 
the telos of consciousness in action. Hamlet, the consummate player, 
is mastered by the game that is represented by plot, but he is 
mastered with full understanding. 
Hamlet's understanding at one point takes the form of self-
identity, when he leaps into the grave crying, "This is I, Hamlet the 
Dane." It later takes the form of recognizing the tautology of time 
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itself as a mode of being. Echoing the clown's tautological proposition 
he says, 
. . . we defy augury. There is special providence in the 
fall of a sparrow. If it be now, 'tis not to come; if it be 
not to come, it will be now; if it be not now, yet it will 
come. The readiness is all. (5.2.208-211) 
His readiness is equivalent to the athlete who is fully "in the game," 
who like the baseball pitcher or the jazz musician is "in the groove" 
and has found the rhythm. As a recent basketball hero said, "I felt 
like I got in a rhythm and I didn't feel anybody could stop me . . . I 
wanted to get it all out."16 Hamlet's readiness is not preparation but 
presence. And he is ready to "get it all out." That is: to exhaust 
identity in action. Action as that which is present and in which 
consciousness participates breaks the conceptual barriers between past 
and future, is represented in Hamlet's speech as another tautology. 
Readiness is the presence of consciousness in the present. Conversely, 
the analytic model of action that divides motive, behavior and per-
formance allows the problem of sequence to intrude and fear of 
futurity to hinder it. The analytic becomes the kind of self-
consciousness that inhibits action. 
Action cannot be identified without a subject. But the subject is 
not simply the agent nor is it the motive because each of these con-
cepts implies something that exists prior to or outside the action. In 
play, however, the act of playing creates the subject. The dramatic 
form of action, in Kenneth Burke's words, "dances an attitude." The 
agent does not determine the action but "finds himself in the action. 
In the most extreme formulation of the tautology, we could say then 
that "Hamlet hamlets Hamlet." 
Hamlet represents the end of the strain of the individual con-
sciousness against the problem of action as an end of the strain of 
language against experience. Hamlet the character ceases to ask how 
action is possible, how to join consciousness with behavior, how to 
align motive, behavior and performance. The poetic desires that 
sought but never achieved a totality of language, identity and action 
are, at the end of Act 5, disconnected, discontinuous. The dying 
sentence is cut off and "the rest is silence." Such silence is the final 
tautology where being speaks. Without language, being that has been 
present but concealed by the problem of action, is briefly revealed in 
the moment of silence. And Hamlet is silent in reference to its 
meaning. The work of art plays itself so its action is "true" but its 
meaning rests in silence. 
Stanford University 
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